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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dustin Rhoades appeals the district court's decision to revoke his probation, or 
alternatively, its decision to not reduce his sentence when it did so. He asserts that 
those decisions constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. As part of his 
appeal, Mr. Rhoades requested that several transcripts be produced and augmented to 
the appellate record, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion. Mr. Rhoades 
contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection.1 As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Rhoades access 
to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing 
raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. In the event that request is 
denied, this Court should still vacate the district court's order revoking probation and 
executing the underlying sentence without modification and remand the case for a new 
disposition hearing. Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Rhoades' sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Rhoades agreed to plead guilty to forgery in 
exchange of the State dismissing three other counts. (R., p.43.) The district court 
imposed a ten-year unified sentence, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 
(R., p.44.) Mr. Rhoades performed well in the rider program during that period of 
retained jurisdiction. The rider staff noted that he had completed or was anticipating 
1 Mr. Rhoades recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court recently heard argument in a 
case raising similar issues. State v. Brunet, Docket No. 39550. Obviously, the decision 
in that case may affect or resolve some of the issues raised in this brief. 
1 
completing all his assigned programs. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.160.)2 He also received no formal disciplinary sanctions in that program (though 
he did receive some informal sanctions). (PSI, p.162.) As a result, the rider staff 
recommended that he be placed on probation. (PSI, p.159.) The district court, at a 
hearing on October 5, 2012, suspended Mr. Rhoades's sentence for a ten-year period 
of probation. (R., pp.48-49; see also R., pp.50-53 (order to that effect).) 
However, Mr. Rhoades did not start off well on probation. His probation officer 
wrote a letter to the district court on November 1, 2012, noting that he was imposing 
fourteen days of discretionary time for several admitted violations. (R., p.58.) After 
serving that discretionary time, Mr. Rhoades began to get things in order. For example, 
he reported attending forty-three AA meetings in forty-three days, as well as going to 
the Easter Seals program twice a week. (Tr., Vol.2, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.5.)3 Copies of 
the green cards documenting Mr. Rhoades's attendance at thirty-seven AA meetings in 
a thirty-seven day period were submitted for the district court's review. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, 
Ls.21-23; Augmentation - Letter with copies of green cards.) Nevertheless, on 
December 20, 2012, Mr. Rhoades was arrested on an agent's warrant, and in January, 
the State filed a motion for probation violation based on many of the same admissions 
for which he had served the discretionary jail time. (R., pp.67-81.) Mr. Rhoades 
admitted four of those allegations, and the State agreed to dismiss the remainder. 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"RhoadesPSI." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents 
attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.). 
3 The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To promote clarity, the volume containing the transcript from the admit/deny 
hearing held on January 18, 2013, will be referred to as "Vol.1." The volume containing 
the transcript form the disposition hearings held on February 1 and February 8, 2013, 
will be referred to as "Vol.2." 
2 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.5, Ls.13-20.) Specifically, Mr. Rhoades admitted that, when he had first 
been released on probation, he drank alcohol at Chili's then drove home while affected 
by those drinks, that he had gone to the Chili's bar and to the Torch on October 7, 2012, 
that he lied about attending rehabilitation programs during that first month of probation, 
and that he had sent letters to a female offender in prison.4 (R., pp.71-72; Tr., Vol.1, 
p.7, L.8 - p.10, L.19; compare R., p.58 (listing the same violations as the basis for the 
imposition of discretionary jail time).) 
The State, pointing to Mr. Rhoades's criminal history, the nature of the 
allegations of violation, and asserting there were potential new charges that might yet 
be filed against Mr. Rhoades, argued for the district court to revoke probation and 
execute the underlying sentence. (Tr., Vol.1, p.9, L.7 - p.10, L.19.) The district court 
postponed the disposition hearing at that time so that the State could update the court 
on the status of those potential new charges it was considering levying against 
Mr. Rhoades. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, L.23 - p.16, L.4.) Defense counsel objected to that 
procedure, arguing that since the allegations had not been filed and no determination of 
guilt made, they should not factor into the district court's decision of whether to revoke 
probation at this time, regardless of their current status. (Tr., Vol.1, p.14, L.14 - p.15, 
L.4.) 
At the continued hearing, defense counsel pointed out that, in addition to 
Mr. Rhoades's improvements following the period of discretionary jail, he had a stable 
situation from which to continue probation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.23; Tr., Vol.2, 
4 In regard to the letter to the female offender, the allegation says the letter was 
intercepted by prison staff on October 30, 2012. (R., p.72.) The report of the contact in 
from IDOC also indicates the contact was occurring at the end of October. (R., pp.86-
87.) However; Mr. Rhoades's admission indicates it occurred after the period of 
discretionary jail. (Tr., Vol.1, p.9, L.25- p.10, L.2.) 
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p.26, Ls.6-7.) As such, counsel recommended that the district court continue probation 
and consider some local jail time so that Mr. Rhoades could participate in the SAP or 
ABC programs, or alternatively, consider another period of retained jurisdiction. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p26, Ls.10-21.) The district court, however decided to revoke probation and 
execute the underlying sentence without modification. (Tr., Vol.2, p.28, L.14 - p.29, 
L.6; R., pp.108-10.) The district court made specific note that it had not read the new 
police reports and was not considering the potential new charges in its decision to 
revoke; that was based purely on the allegations to which Mr. Rhoades admitted. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.30, Ls.6-12.) It did, however, award Mr. Rhoades with 319 days of credit 
for time served. (R., p.109.) Mr. Rhoades filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.115-
17.) 
Mr. Rhoades also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for leniency. (R., p.111.) 
However, the district court denied that motion, noting that no documents or information 
had been filed in support of that motion.5 (Augmentation - Order Denying Motion to 
Reduce Sentence, p.2.) Mr. Rhoades also filed a pro se motion for credit for time 
served, requesting a total of 329 days of credit. (R., pp.118, 122-23.) The district court, 
in the order on that motion, indicated that no action would be taken because the motion 
"was filed by a non-party. Defendant is still represented by the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office."6 (Augmentation - Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence, p.2 
n.1.) 
5 Mr. Rhoades does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
6 While noting that he is a "party" in this case, a fact not changed regardless of whether 
or not he is represented by counsel, Mr. Rhoades is not challenging the district court's 
decision to not consider his pro se motion. 
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On appeal, Mr. Rhoades moved to augment the record with transcripts from the 
change of plea hearing held on March 28, 2012, the transcript from the sentencing 
hearing held on May 9, 2012, the transcript from the rider review hearing held on 
October 5, 2012, and the transcript from the admit/deny hearing held on January 18, 
2013. (Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in 
Support Thereof, filed June 13, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court only granted that 
motion in regard to the admit/deny hearing held on January 18, 2013. (Order, dated 
July 2, 2013.) Mr. Rhoades renewed his motion in regard to the three transcripts which 
had not been augmented to the record, providing additional authorities and arguments 
demonstrating why those transcripts needed to be included in the appellate record. 
(Renewed Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in 
Support Thereof, filed September 9, 2013.) That motion was denied without 
explanation. (Order Denying Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, dated September 27, 2013 (emphasis in original).) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Rhoades due process and equal 
protection when it denied his renewed motion to augment the record with 
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Rhoades's 
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Rhoades Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Renewed Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
indigent defendants that they will not be denied access to transcripts which are relevant 
to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So long as the record reflects a colorable need 
for such a transcript, a court may not refuse to provide that transcript unless the State 
proves that the transcript is not relevant to an issue raised on appeal. 
Mr. Rhoades has raised a challenge to the decision to revoke his probation and 
execute his sentence, or, alternatively, to not reduce his sentence sua sponte when it 
did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be made part of the 
appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts from 
the change of plea hearing held on March 28, 2012, the sentencing hearing held on 
May 9, 2012, and the transcript from the rider review hearing held on October 5, 2012. 
As such, Mr. Rhoades is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of 
his request for these transcripts. Mr. Rhoades asserts that the requested transcripts are 
relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his probation 
and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review requires an 
appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in 
order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions. 
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B. By Failing To Provide Mr. Rhoades With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Rhoades Due Process And Equal 
Protection Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His 
Claims 
1. The United States Constitution And The Idaho Constitution Require, As 
Part Of Their Protections Of Due Process And Equal Protection, 
Transcripts Of Relevant Hearings To Be Provided To Indigent Defendants 
The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law. 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; IDAHO CONST. art I, § 13. Due process requires the defendant 
be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333 (1976) State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that 
judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham 
City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have 
been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of 
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a); 
I.C.R. 54.?(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction 
and affects the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right. I.AR 11 (c)(9); 
State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established. Its decisions have 
8 
established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and equal 
protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not 
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review, 
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. 
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial 
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript 
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that 
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem .... Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on 
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
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poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 ( citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. 
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript 
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative 
exists. Id. at 20. 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck 
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a 
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held: 
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it 
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure 
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the 
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second 
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency. 
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible 
destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at 
258. 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court clarified its statement in Griffin -
that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available. 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963). To that end, the Court did note 
that "part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
10 
unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. at 495. However, the Court went on to 
discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance 
of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those 
defendants could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic 
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified 
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971 ). Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the 
requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at 
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. If 
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary 
for the appeal. Id. 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized 
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard. See, e.g., 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects 
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved 
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal 
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record. 
11 
2. The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Rhoades Are Relevant To The Issues 
He Has Raised On Appeal 
The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Rhoades's claim that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed 
to reduce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. These transcripts are all necessary 
because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the appellate courts will conduct an 
independent review of the record available to the district court. State v. Pierce, 150 
Idaho 1, 5 (2010). Particularly, in probation revocation cases the standard of review 
involves a review of the entire record. See State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). 
This includes information from the original sentencing hearing and the change of plea 
hearing where the district court heard directly from the defendant, who was accepting 
some level of responsibility by pleading guilty. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)). This standard of review is necessary 
in Idaho because judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale on the 
record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665,666 (1984). 
The transcript from the March 28, 2012, change of plea hearing is specifically 
necessary based on prior decisions by Idaho's appellate courts, which are, for the 
moment, good law. See, e.g., State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) 
("Burdett has failed to include the transcript form his change of plea hearing wherein, 
according to the district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his 
guilty plea. Portions of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the 
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actions of the district court."); see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) 
(applying the same presumption in absence of a complete record). The minutes from 
that hearing indicate that Mr. Rhoades was sworn and examined by the district court. 
(R., p.33.) Therefore, because his comments would be available for consideration at a 
future sentencing determination (like the one currently on appeal), they are part of the 
record an appellate court reviewing that future determination would consider. Pierce, 
150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. As such, a transcript of the March 28, 
2012, hearing should have been augmented to the record. 
The transcript from the May 9, 2012, sentencing hearing is specifically necessary 
because Mr. Rhoades made a statement of allocution to the district court. (R., p.42.) 
The defendant's statements in allocution are relevant to the sentencing determination. 
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding that, while 
allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right, as 
the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested), rev. denied. Therefore, 
because his comments would be available for consideration at a future sentencing 
determination, they are part of the record an appellate court reviewing that future 
determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. As 
such, a transcript of the May 9, 2012, hearing should have been augmented to the 
record. 
The transcript from the October 5, 2012, rider review hearing is specifically 
necessary for similar reasons. Mr. Rhoades made a statement to the district court. 
(R., p.49.) Rider review hearings, such as the one held on October 5, 2012, deal with 
similar concerns to sentencing hearings, since the district court is deciding whether or 
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not to release the defendant on probation or to remand him back into custody. State v. 
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct App. 1990); see also State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 
(1998). That decision is guided by the same factors that the district court considers at 
sentencing. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. Therefore, the defendant's statements at a 
rider review hearing are as relevant to future sentencing determination as a statement in 
allocution made at an initial sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; 
Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. As such, they are part of the record that an appellate court 
reviewing a future sentencing determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Therefore, a transcript of the October 5, 2012, hearing 
should have been augmented to the appellate record. 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently discussed the scope of review of 
an order revoking a defendant's probation in response to a similar challenge. See 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals held that the 
transcripts of the proceedings predating the probation violation currently on appeal were 
not necessary of the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the 
second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it 
based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." 
Id. at 621. In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeals refused to address the 
defendant's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the 
basis that it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme 
Court.7 Id. at 621. However, the Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the 
7 If the Court of Appeals is correct, and it is without authority to decide such questions, 
then an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would constitute an 
independent violation of Mr. Rhoades's state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I §13. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has explained: 
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authority to review a renewed motion to augment, which contained information or 
argument not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of 
Appeals after the case was assigned to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. Nevertheless, in cases where it has been 
presented with such a motion, it has denied the motion without explanation. See 
State v. Jorgensen, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No.615, p.2 (Ct. App. August 5, 2013), 
pet. rev. filed. As such, it appears unlikely that filing a renewed motion with the Court of 
Appeals will lead to anything except a new, independent violation of Mr. Rhoades's due 
process and equal protection rights. 
Despite asserting it was without authority to consider the issue, the Court of 
Appeals turned to the merits of the claim in Morgan, explaining that the scope of review 
for a revocation determination did not include a review of those previous hearings: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to an including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
Card, 121 Idaho at 445. In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by 
statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. Defendants have the right to appeal from judgments 
affecting their substantial rights. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594; I.A.R.11(c)(9). The 
decision to revoke probation is such an order. Therefore, since the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of 
Appeals knowing it was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein. 
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to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (emphasis in original). However, in reaching a decision regarding the defendant's 
sentence, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the district court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) 
(recognizing that the district court could rely upon "the number of certain types of 
criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district 
and the quantity of drugs therein involved"). In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that 
such review is not only proper, but is actually expected because "the judge hardly could 
be expected to disregard what he already knew about [the defendant] from the other 
case." State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491,495 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, the Morgan Court's 
assertion that these prior hearings were not relevant to the district court's decision is 
erroneous, since the district courts are expected to rely on their memories of what 
transpired at those previous hearings. 
In fact, the reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order 
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not 
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment 
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire 
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. 
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When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts. 
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the 
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the 
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does 
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were 
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived 
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but 
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive 
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be 
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do 
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant 
files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the 
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into 
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the 
events which occurred during those proceedings. 
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite 
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate 
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the 
district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition 
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the appellate 
courts will presume that the district court considered the prejudgment events when 
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. See Sivak, 
105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74; Gibson, 
106 Idaho at 495. Therefore, these hearings were relevant to the district court's 
decision of whether to revoke probation, and thus, the transcripts of those hearings are 
necessary to the appellate record. See Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Chapman, 111 Idaho 
149; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. 
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3. The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Rhoades's Constitutional Rights 
By Denying His Motion To Augment The Record With The Relevant 
Transcripts 
Since the requested transcripts are relevant under the applicable standard of 
review, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Rhoades access to those 
transcripts constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See, 
e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859. For example, when a 
verbatim transcript was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the 
courts improperly foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent 
defendants access to such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963). 
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to 
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in 
Idaho, an appellant must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural 
default: "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an 
adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of 
error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are 
presumed to support the actions of the trial court."8 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 
8 If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is 
possible the appellate courts might find those minutes to be sufficient to conduct a 
meaningful appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate 
review in such a case. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20 (noting that these rights may be 
protected by an alternative to a verbatim transcript so long as that alternative is 
adequate and effective to allow for appellate review). However, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court 
minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 
Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be 
sufficient to conduct a meaningful review, and thus, a record containing only the 
minutes is unlikely to comport with the constitutional requirements to provide due 
process and equal protection. 
For example, the minutes of the May 9, 2012, sentencing hearing only indicate 
that Mr. Rhoades made a "statement." (R., p.42.) It does not make any reference to 
the contents of the statements. (See R., p.42.) The contents of those statements, 
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(Ct. App. 1999); see also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in 
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Rhoades fails to provide the appellate 
court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will 
apply and Mr. Rhoades's claims regarding the excessiveness of his sentence will not be 
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption would deprive him of an effective 
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection 
grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85. 
If it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access to the 
necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due 
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that 
situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at those 
hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to revoke 
probation. When Mr. Rhoades was first placed on probation at the rider review hearing, 
particularly since they would be classified as the defendant's statements of allocution, 
are relevant to an abuse of discretion in sentencing claim, such as is being made in this 
case (see Section II, infra). See, e.g., Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho 
at 816. The same problem exists in regard to the minutes of the other hearings for 
which Mr. Rhoades requested transcripts. (See, e.g., R., p.33 (minutes of the 
March 28, 2012, change of plea hearing, indicating only that "Defendant Sworn/Waives 
Rights" and "Court Questions Defendant"); R., p.49 (minutes of the October 5, 2012, 
rider review hearing, indicating only that Mr. Rhoades made a "statement").) Therefore, 
the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these statements, are insufficient in 
this case to provide for adequate review. See Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491. 
Furthermore, the record and transcripts that do exist in this case demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the minutes. While one of the transcripts makes it clear that 
documentation was provided to support one of Mr. Rhoades's assertions in mitigation 
(specifically, the copies of his AA attendance cards (see Augmentation - Letter with 
copies of green cards)), the minutes omit the fact that such evidence had been 
discussed altogether. (Compare Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.21-23 (counsel stating that the 
defense had submitted documents speaking to mitigation for the district court's 
consideration in its disposition decision); with R., pp.105-06 (the minutes from the 
disposition hearings, which do not indicate whether such documents were provided). 
Therefore, in this case particularly, the minutes are insufficient to protect Mr. Rhoades's 
constitutional rights. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20; Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491. 
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the district court must have found that the circumstances were right to give Mr. Rhoades 
the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See Merwin, 131 
Idaho at 648. Therefore, by placing Mr. Rhoades on probation, the district court must 
have determined that the mitigating evidence considered outweighed the aggravating 
evidence considered at that hearing. See I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. As 
such, to presume that the missing transcripts of those hearings supports the decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction ignores the mitigating factors that were present at those hearings 
and presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Rhoades. As a result, the denial of 
access to the requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Rhoades from addressing those 
positive factors in support of his appellate claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Rhoades 
argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be 
presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to 
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate 
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all 
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not 
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on 
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As 
such, the decision to deny Mr. Rhoades's request for the necessary transcripts will 
render his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the 
missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This effectively 
functions as a procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Rhoades's sentencing 
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claims on the merits and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested 
transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Rhoades's request for 
those transcripts was denied, that presumption means that the district court's 
sentencing decisions should be reversed. 
C. By Failing To Provide Mr. Rhoades With Access To The Requested Transcripts, 
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, has 
determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives 
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As 
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments 
to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The 
constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained 
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role 
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.; 
see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack 
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a 
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conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel 
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual 
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Rhoades has 
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims 
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for 
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). These standards offer insight into the role 
and responsibilities of appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to 
advise Mr. Rhoades on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. 
Mr. Rhoades is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Rhoades his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include the right to 
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effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Rhoades's Probation Or, 
Alternatively, When It Executed His Sentence Without Modification When It Did So 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Rhoades's Probation 
Mr. Rhoades asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke his 
probation and execute his unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, was an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within 
the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection 
of society." Id. The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether 
probation or incarceration is merited. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648 (citing I.C. § 19-2521). 
In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry, 
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13 
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989)). 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard 
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; 
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(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; 
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be 
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether 
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served 
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). These same factors are 
appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation. See 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009). 
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Rhoades. As 
a result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Rhoades's probation was adequately 
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from 
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Mr. Rhoades through incarceration. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. Therefore, this 
disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
First, Mr. Rhoades had been improving after having been ordered to serve 
fourteen days of discretionary jail time while on probation. As counsel pointed out, the 
allegations filed in the motion for probation violation predated Mr. Rhoades's 
discretionary jail time. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.20-25; see R., pp.70-73.) While the double 
punishment does not, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, violate Mr. Rhoades's 
constitutional right to due process, State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 870-72 (2012), it 
is a factor which should have been considered to weigh against revoking probation, 
since it demonstrates his potential for continued rehabilitation. He had been punished 
for that behavior, accepted responsibility in that regard, and had sorted out the situation 
so as to be successful on probation. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.5.) 
Besides, it actually demonstrates that he adhered to the terms and conditions of his 
probation, which should weigh in mitigation. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 
610 (1992) (discussing discretionary jail time as a term and condition of probation). 
Demonstrating that, since that period of discretionary jail, Mr. Rhoades had 
sorted out his issues and was complying with the terms of probation, Mr. Rhoades 
reported to the district court that, with the help of his mother and fiancee, he was trying 
to get into an additional treatment program alongside AA (attending 43 meetings in 43 
days following his period of discretionary jail) and the Easter Seals program (twice a 
week). (Tr., Vol.2, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.5; Augmentation - Letter with copies of green 
cards (demonstrating Mr. Rhoades's participation in daily AA meetings).) The Court of 
Appeals has noted that the simple willingness to participate in treatment programs is of 
"modest consequence" to sentencing determinations. State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 
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817 (Ct. App. 2010). If the simple willingness to enroll is of modest consequence to the 
sentencing determination, then facts demonstrating that the probationer is actually 
starting to follow through after getting everything sorted should be of significant 
consequence to the sentencing determination. See id. As such, his improvement in 
regard to the probation programming is another factor weighing in favor of not revoking 
probation. Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817. 
Mr. Rhoades has also expressed remorse for his conduct. (See, e.g., PSI, p.4.) 
Also, by admitting these lapses to his probation officer (which is what led to the 
discretionary jail time in the first place), he was accepting responsibility for his actions. 
(See R., p.58.) Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the 
defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815. 
One fact that played into the decision to invoke discretionary jail time was that 
Mr. Rhoades was switching to a new medication regimen, a fact which he had reported 
to his probation officer. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.12.) Mr. Rhoades suffers from, 
and takes medication, for depression and ADHD. (PSI, p.17 (noting the medications 
Mr. Rhoades takes); PSI, p.29 (confirming the diagnosis of dysthemic disorder 
(depression)); PSI, pp.96-97 (Dr. Delawyer writing about his treatment of Mr. Rhoades 
based on his diagnosis of ADHD).) I.C. § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a 
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 
(1999). Therefore, the fact that he was adjusting to a new medication regimen and, 
once the issues surrounding that and the adjustment to probation were sorted out, he 
began to improve and adhere to the terms of his probation. ( See Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.13-
23 (counsel discussing the improvements in Mr. Rhoades's participation on probation); 
Tr., Vol.2, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.5 (Mr. Rhoades reporting the same).) 
26 
In regard to his ability to continue succeeding on probation, Mr. Rhoades has 
continuing support from various family members, including his parents, who were willing 
to allow Mr. Rhoades to continue living in their home. (PSI, pp.12, 124-28.) Having a 
support network in place is a factor which suggests the defendant will be better able to 
rehabilitate. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to affirm 
the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in consideration 
of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would 
be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). Mr. Rhoades also has employable skills. 
(See PSI, p.15; PSI, p.27 (reporting that Mr. Rhoades has worked for eleven years as a 
diesel mechanic).) In fact, he has an associate's degree from Wyoming Technical 
Institute as a mechanic. (PSI, pp.72-73 (transcripts indicating degree conferred in 
September 2001 ).) His former employer was willing to rehire him full time at the end of 
his period of retained jurisdiction. (See, e.g., PSI, p.163.) This not only demonstrates 
the ability to be a productive member of society, but also the capability to be able to pay 
fines and fees, which is a factor which should weigh in favor of probation. See 
I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(f). 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence, 
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and 
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the 
imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
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sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the 
district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original 
sentence if Mr. Rhoades were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it 
could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What 
the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity 
to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Rhoades to apply the lessons he 
would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. 
B. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not. Sua Sponte, 
Reducing Mr. Rhoades's Sentence When It Revoked His Probation 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Rhoades's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not reducing Mr. Rhoades's sentence pursuant 
to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides to resume the execution of the 
underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce 
the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 
782 (2008). 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are the same 
as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi!f, 103 Idaho at 568 (identifying 
the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the district court needed to 
sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating 
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factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should 
result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595. 
Sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to 
continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of 
recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 
1988). For all the reasons discussed in the previous section, Mr. Rhoades has 
demonstrated that rehabilitation and age are starting to reduce the risk of recidivism, 
which should merit, at least, a more lenient sentence. See id. Such a sentence would 
allow Mr. Rhoades the opportunity to return to his rehabilitative programs sooner, and 
that is important because timing is an important consideration when addressing 
rehabilitation. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 ); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 
91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. Therefore, the district 
court should have, at least, reduced his sentence when it revoked his probation. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence 
would still address all the sentencing objectives - protection of society, punishment, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence. See Ransom, 124 Idaho at 713 (requiring that alternative 
sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). The more lenient sentence would 
still impose and executes a sentence. Thus, even though the sentences in this case 
may be more lenient, they would still provide for a significant period of custodial 
supervision, if not incarceration. Such a sentence would punish Mr. Rhoades by 
depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but several of his rights (such 
as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Therefore, both 
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retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., 
State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct App. 2008) (discussing how even a sentence 
for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives). 
In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society, 
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive 
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Rhoades would be in the custody of the 
Department of Correction either way. He would be unable to harm society during the 
period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion of 
whether to release him again. 
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence 
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, 
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. 
Specifically, it would give Mr. Rhoades the opportunity to return to his family and build 
those relationships, offering and receiving support in that community. Failing to provide 
the rehabilitative alternatives would actually decrease the protection for society in the 
long term because such a sentence does not decrease the risk for recidivism as 
effectively as a sentence which does focus on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to 
protect society would be to provide Mr. Rhoades with rehabilitative opportunities. To 
not do so results in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the 




Mr. Rhoades respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Rhoades respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate, or, in the alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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